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Huw Price has proposed an argument that suggests a time-symmetric ontology for quantum theory
must necessarily be retrocausal, i.e. it must involve influences that travel backwards in time. One of
Price’s assumptions is that the quantum state is a state of reality. However, one of the reasons for
exploring retrocausality is that it offers the potential for evading the consequences of no-go theorems,
including recent proofs of the reality of the quantum state. Here, we show that this assumption can
be replaced by a different assumption, called λ-mediation, that plausibly holds independently of the
status of the quantum state. We also reformulate the other assumptions behind the argument to
place them in a more general framework and pin down the notion of time symmetry involved more
precisely. We show that our assumptions imply a timelike analogue of Bell’s local causality criterion
and, in doing so, give a new interpretation of timelike violations of Bell inequalities. Namely, they
show the impossibility of a (non-retrocausal) time-symmetric ontology.
I. INTRODUCTION
In [1], Huw Price gave an argument to the effect that
any time symmetric ontology for quantum theory must
involve retrocausality (influences that travel backwards
in time). Price’s argument is based on analysing an ex-
periment where a single photon is passed through two
polarizing beamsplitters in sequence.
One of Price’s assumptions, which he calls Realism
[2], is really an assumption of the reality of the quan-
tum state. Briefly, he assumes that the usual forwards-
evolving polarization vector of a photon emerging from
a polarizing beam splitter is a real physical property of
the photon. This is an assumption of the reality of the
quantum state because the polarization vector is isomor-
phic to the part of the quantum state that describes the
polarization degree of freedom. Price uses this, together
with his other assumptions, to argue that there must also
be a backwards evolving polarization vector coming from
the second beam splitter that is oriented along its mea-
surement direction, and hence there is retrocausality.
The reality of both forwards and backwards evolving
states implied by Price’s argument occurs in the transac-
tional interpretation of quantum theory [3, 4], and is rem-
iniscent of the two state vector formalism of Aharonov
and collaborators [5, 6]. Indeed, if we interpret the two
state vectors in the formalism as a description of real-
ity, rather than just a convenient mathematical way of
re-expressing the predictions of quantum theory in situa-
tions of pre- and post-selection, then this theory satisfies
Price’s assumptions.
However, one possible response to Price’s argument is
to simply deny the reality of the quantum state, in favor
of the ψ-epistemic view, which says that the quantum
state is not a physical property of a system, but rather
something more akin to a probability distribution, such
as a Liouville distribution in statistical mechanics. In
other words, it describes our knowledge about the quan-
tum system rather than being an intrinsic property of
an individual system. If we do not believe that the for-
wards evolving state vector is a state of reality, than
neither Price’s aregument nor the two state vector for-
malism, provides evidence that we should view the back-
wards evolving state vector as a state of reality. The
ψ-epistemic view provides natural explanations for many
quantum phenomena that are otherwise puzzling, such
as the indistinguishability of quantum states and the no-
cloning theorem, which have been discussed in detail else-
where [7, 8]. Although several recent results [9–21] (see
[8] for a review) cast doubt on the viability of the ψ-
epistemic view, all of these results assume that there is
no retrocausality, so allowing for retrocausality is a po-
tentially appealing way of saving the ψ-epistemic view.
Because of this, it would be preferable not to rule out
ψ-epistemic theories a priori when making an argument
for retrocausality.
The first aim of this paper, is to construct an alterna-
tive to Price’s argument, which does not assume the re-
ality of the quantum state. This turns out to be possible
using a different assumption, that we call λ-mediation,
which plausibly holds independently of the status of the
quantum state. Briefly, it says that any correlations be-
tween a preparation and a measurement made on a sys-
tem should be mediated by the physical properties of the
system. There is a close parallel between the relationship
between Price’s argument and ours, and the relationship
between the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument
and Bell’s theorem. In fact, our assumptions imply a
timelike analogue of Bell’s local causality condition. It is
well-known that sequences of measurements made on the
same system can violate Bell inequalities, the significance
of which has long been debated [22–34]. Our argument
provides a new spin on this — temporal Bell violations
can be viewed as proofs of the impossibility of a time-
symmetric ontology (unless we allow retrocausality).
In fact, it is possible to prove a weaker result even with-
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2out λ-mediation, based on the Colbeck-Renner theorem
[35, 36], which we discuss in appendix A.
The second aim of this paper is to clarify and extend
the scope of the other assumptions behind Price’s argu-
ment. Like Bell’s theorem, we are aiming for a result
that is independent of the details of quantum theory, so
that we can say whether or not a given operational the-
ory allows for a time symmetric ontology. In order to do
this, we have to replace one of Price’s assumptions, which
he calls Discreteness by a broader principle that can be
formulated at this level of generality. Doing so clarifies
the precise notion of time-symmetry that is at stake in
the argument.
In particular, an obvious objection to both Price’s and
our argument is that unitary evolution according to the
Schro¨dinger equation is time symmetric, in the conven-
tional sense of time-symmetry of dynamical laws. There-
fore, an interpretation like Everett/many-worlds [37–39],
in which a unitarily evolving quantum state is the en-
tire ontology, is time-symmetric without requiring retro-
causality. The same is true of interpretations that sup-
plement this picture with additional variables that also
evolve under time-symmetric equations of motion, such
as de Broglie-Bohm theory [40–43]. Hence, a direct in-
ference from the conventional notion of time symmetry
to retrocausality is out of the question.
In Price’s version of the argument, these theories are
ruled out by Discreteness. This says that if a photon
is detected at one of the output ports of a polarizing
beamsplitter then nothing comes out of the other ports
of the beamsplitter. This assumption is needed so that
a photon exiting a beamsplitter and then being detected
can be treated as the time reverse of inserting a photon
into a beamsplitter through a definite port. Everett and
de Broglie-Bohm violate this assumption because, when
a photon exits a beamsplitter, there are branches of the
quantum state that exit along each of the ports. These
represent what will become different worlds in Everett,
and they are empty waves that do not contain a particle
in de Broglie-Bohm.
We also note that there is some tension between the
Discreteness and Realism assumptions. Realism requires
that the quantum state of the system should be real while
it is travelling between the two beamsplitters. If this is
true then it would be natural to require that the quan-
tum state exiting the second beamsplitter should also be
real, even though this is not strictly required by Realism.
However, this would contradict Discreteness. The ten-
sion is removed if we allow for ψ-epistemic models, since
then the branch of the quantum state that exits the port
of the beamsplitter on which the photon is not detected
need not correspond to anything real [44].
In our view, the symmetry between preparations and
measurements in quantum theory is the main motivation
for Discreteness, so we prefer to base our version of the
argument on the former, as it makes it clearer that the
argument involves a stronger notion of time symmetry
than the conventional one. Discreteness itself would be
difficult to formulate at the level of generality we are try-
ing to achieve in any case. It is known that sequences
of quantum experiments can be described by a retrod-
ictive formalism [45–48], in which quantum states are
associated with measurement outcomes and are evolved
backwards in time to preparations, which are in turn de-
scribed by what we normally think of as “measurement”
operators. The symmetry in question is that the retrod-
ictive formalism is mathematically identical to the con-
ventional predictive formalism, in which quantum states
are evolved forwards in time from preparation to mea-
surement, so every quantum experiment has a kind of
time reverse, in which the roles of the predictive and
retrodictive operators are exchanged. A simple example
of follows from the observation that | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2 = | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2.
Consider two experiments, the first of which consists of
preparing one state uniformly at random from a com-
plete orthonormal basis {|ψn〉}, and then measuring in
another orthonormal basis {|ψm〉}. In the second exper-
iment, the order is reversed, so that a state is prepared
uniformly at random from {|φm〉} and then measured in
the basis {|ψn〉}. Because | 〈φm|ψn〉 |2 = | 〈ψn|φm〉 |2, the
joint probability of obtaining |ψn〉 and |φm〉 is the same
in both experiments. Hence, the predictive probability
of obtaining |φm〉 given that |ψn〉 was prepared in the
first experiment is the same as the retrodictive probabil-
ity of having prepared |φm〉 given that the measurement
outcome was |ψn〉 in the second experiment. Our Time
Symmetry assumption says that this symmetry, which
is a symmetry of the operational predictions of quantum
theory, should be taken seriously as a fundamental sym-
metry, and therefore imposed at the ontological level as
well. We formulate this assumption rigorously, indepen-
dently of the details of quantum theory, and base our
argument on it. Note that Time Symmetry is differ-
ent from the usual notion of time symmetry of dynamical
laws, and neither Everett or de Broglie-Bohm satisfy the
former.
Given this, one might question whether Time Sym-
metry is really necessary. However, our assumption does
bear a family resemblance to the assumptions behind
other no-go theorems that are often regarded as reason-
able. In particular, Spekkens’ notion of noncontextu-
ality says that experimental procedures that are opera-
tionally indistinguishable ought to be represented in the
same way at the ontological level [49]. Time Symmetry
could be motivated by a principle that extends this to say
that a symmetry of the operational predictions ought to
also hold at the ontological level. Spekkens’ principle is
then just the special case where the symmetry is iden-
tity of operational predictions. Whilst one might quibble
about applying this principle to every possible symme-
try of the operational predictions, some of which may be
accidental, it seems reasonable to apply it to fundamen-
tal symmetries, and time symmetry is pretty fundamen-
tal. We therefore think that it is surprising that a con-
ventional realist (non retrocausal) interpretation cannot
satisfy Time Symmetry, and that the fact that Ev-
3erett and de Broglie-Bohm do not is a genuine deficiency
of those theories.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
§II, we outline several notions of time symmetry and ex-
plain how the notion used in this paper differs from the
conventional one. §III introduces our operational for-
malism for prepare-and-measure experiments. §IV for-
mally defines our operational notion of time symmetry
and shows that quantum theory satisfies it. §V and §VI
mirror this structure at the ontological level. §V intro-
duces our main assumptions about realist models of op-
erational theories, including No Retrocausality and
λ-mediation, and §VI defines our notion of ontologi-
cal time symmetry. §VII explains our Time Symme-
try assumption, which is that operational time symme-
tries should be reflected at the ontological level. §VIII
contains our main results. §VIII A proves that models
satisfying our assumptions must obey Bell’s local causal-
ity condition for timelike experiments. §VIII B gives a
simple example of how quantum theory violates this,
and §VIII C shows that there is an isomorphism between
spacelike and timelike experiments, which allows us to
port all existing results about violation of bipartite Bell
inequalities with entangled states to the timelike context.
In §IX, we compare our assumptions with Price’s, and re-
formulate the logic of his argument in our framework. §X
explains why de Broglie-Bohm and Everett do not sat-
isfy Time Symmetry, but this does not conflict with
their dynamical time symmetry. §XI discusses the rela-
tion of our main result with Spekkens’ notion of prepara-
tion contextuality, and discusses the relevance of experi-
ments that have recently been conducted to test this. In
§XII, we conclude by discussing which assumption ought
to be given up in the light of our results. Appendix A
discusses how the Colbeck-Renner theorem can be used
to obtain a weaker result without λ-mediation.
II. TIME SYMMETRY
The usual notion of time symmetry used in physics is
a symmetry of the dynamics, wherein there is a one-to-
one correspondence between solutions to the equations of
motion and solutions to the modified equations obtained
by replacing t with −t. However, this is not the only
notion of time symmetry worth considering. We start
from the more informal idea that time symmetry is the
inability to tell whether a video of a physical process is
running forwards or backwards, and note that this can
be formalized in several different ways.
First of all, it matters if one really means an actual
video, which can only capture things that are observ-
able, or whether the video is merely a conceptual stand
in for a complete record of everything that exists. We call
the former kind of time symmetry an operational time
symmetry and the latter an ontological time symmetry.
Our argument makes use of both kinds of time symme-
try, and is based on the assumption that one should take
an operational symmetry as evidence for an ontological
one. We formalize operational time symmetry in §IV,
after introducing our operational formalism in §III, and
we formalize ontological time symmetry in §VI, after we
have introduced the ontological framework in §V.
Secondly, it makes a difference whether one is only in-
terested in whether a given video is possible in both time
directions, or whether there is a process that makes it
equally likely in both time directions. A smashed glass
spontaneously reconstituting itself is not impossible ac-
cording to the laws of physics. According to the usual
notion of dynamical time symmetry, a spontaneously re-
constituting glass is a possible solution to the equations
of motion whenever an unbroken glass smashing into
pieces is. However, a spontaneously reconstituting glass
is vastly less likely, given the low entropy initial condi-
tions of the universe. In light of this, we can consider a
stronger notion of time symmetry in which we also de-
mand that the probability of occurrence should be the
same in both time directions. This holds, for example,
for systems that are in thermal equilibrium. It is this
stronger notion of time-symmetry that we will be con-
sidering here. Of course, the universe as a whole does
not display such time-symmetry, and we will not be as-
suming that it does. However, it is possible to construct
experiments that have this time-symmetry at the opera-
tional level. Our main assumption will be that, if this is
the case, the same symmetry ought to hold at the onto-
logical level as well.
III. OPERATIONAL FORMALISM
We will be discussing experiments consisting of three
stages, a preparation P , a transformation T , and a mea-
surement M (see fig. 1). Each preparation and measure-
ment has an input, which is under the control of the
experimenter, and an output, which they do not directly
control, i.e. the outputs may be correlated with the in-
puts, but the experimenter does not have any further con-
trol over the outputs other than via choosing the inputs.
As an example, in Price’s argument, both the preparation
and measurement devices are polarizing beam splitters
and, in both cases, the inputs are the choice of angle at
which to orient the beamsplitter. For the measurement,
the output is which output port of the beamsplitter the
photon is detected on. For the preparation, the output is
the choice of which input port to insert the photon into
the beamsplitter from. Note here that our distinction be-
tween input and output should be thought of as the dis-
tinction between controlled and uncontrolled variables,
and does not necessarily represent the order in which
things happen to the photon. The photon is inserted
into the input port before it encounters the beamsplitter
oriented at a certain angle. Nonetheless, the angle is our
“input” and the port is our “output” because the former
is controlled by the experimenter and the latter is not.
The choice of input port is in principle controllable by the
4experimenter but, in the specific setup used by Price, it
is not actually controlled by them, but rather by a third
party, which Price calls the “demon of the left”. For this
reason, it is important not to think of the input as con-
sisting of everything that is in principle controllable by
the experimenter and the outputs as everything that is
in principle uncontrollable, but rather the inputs are the
variables that they actually control and the outputs are
variables that they do not actually control, even if some
of them are in principle controllable. To make the argu-
ment work, it is necessary to place constraints on what
the experimenter controls. We shall return to the reason
and justification for this in §IV.
Although, in Price’s argument, the output of the
preparation represents something that happens to the
photon before the input, it is important to note that the
input is always chosen before the output. The experi-
menter decides how to orient the beamsplitter and then
the “demon of the left” chooses on which port to insert
the photon. In general, we should think of preparations
and measurements as black-box devices, which have a
setting switch that allows the experimenter to choose the
input and a pointer or screen that subsequently displays
the output. Regardless of what is happening inside the
black box, the operational act of choosing the input al-
ways happens before the output is displayed, so, in a non
retrocausal theory, the input can causally influence the
output but not vice versa.
x
a
y
b
P MT
FIG. 1. Illustration of prepare-transform-measure experi-
ment.
The final piece of the setup is the transformation,
which just represents the dynamics of the system between
preparation and measurement. In Price’s example, this
is trivial as the polarization degree of freedom does not
evolve as it passes between the two beamsplitters, but
we will consider what happens when dynamics, which
may include decoherence and losses to the environment,
is added to the picture.
An operational theory specifies a set P of possible
preparations, a set M of possible measurements, and a
set T of possible transformations. In general, a theory
may include different types of systems, e.g. in quantum
theory we have photons, atoms, etc. that have different
degrees of freedom and are described by Hilbert spaces
of differing dimensionality. Therefore, not every prepara-
tion, transformation, and measurement need be compat-
ible with one another, e.g. it does not make sense to use
a device for measuring the energy of an atom to measure
the polarization of a photon. We call a triple (P,M, T )
of preparation, measurement, and transformation that
are compatible with each other an experiment. For ev-
ery experiment (P,M, T ), the operational theory must
also specify a prediction of the probabilities of the output
variables of P and M , given the choice of input variables.
We write these probabilities as pPMT (a, b|x, y), where x
is the input of P and a is its output, and y is the input
of M and b is its output.
For example, in quantum theory, a preparation P is
associated with a Hilbert space HA, a set of (unnor-
malized) density operators {ρaA|x} on HA — one for
each choice of x and a — such that the ensemble av-
erage density operators ρA|x =
∑
a ρaA|x are normal-
ized Tr
(
ρA|x
)
= 1. The preparation procedure starts
with the experimenter choosing x. The preparation de-
vice then generates a classical variable a with probabil-
ity distribution p(a|x) = Tr (ρaA|x), outputs a, and pre-
pares the system in the corresponding (normalized) state
ρaA|x/p(a|x), which is subsequently fed into the transfor-
mation device.
A measurement M is described by a set {Eb|yB} of Pos-
itive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs) on a Hilbert
space HB — one POVM for each choice of y. This means
that for each (y, b), Eb|yB is a positive operator, and for
all y,
∑
bEb|yB = IB , where IB is the identity operator
on HB .
A transformation is described by a completely-positive,
trace-preserving (CPT) map E from the density operators
on the input Hilbert space Hin to the density operators
on the output Hilbert space Hout. We allow Hin and
Hout to differ because the transformation may involve
discarding part of the system into the environment or
adding ancillas.
A triple (P,M, T ) is an experiment only if Hin = HA
and Hout = HB , in which case we write the CP-map as
EB|A.
For such an experiment, by the Born rule, quantum
theory predicts the probabilities
pPMT (a, b|x, y) = Tr
(
Eb|yBEB|A
(
ρaA|x
))
. (1)
IV. OPERATIONAL TIME-SYMMETRY
Definition IV.1. An experiment (P,M, T ) has an op-
erational time reverse if there exists another experiment
(P ′,M ′, T ′) where P ′ has the same set of inputs and out-
puts as M , M ′ has the same set of inputs and outputs
as P , and
pP ′M ′T ′(b, a|y, x) = pPMT (a, b|x, y) (2)
An operational theory has operational time symmetry
if every experiment has an operational time reverse.
5For each run of an experiment, consider a record of
the inputs and outputs of the preparation and measure-
ment (x, a, y, b). The experiment is repeated an arbitrar-
ily large number of times with each choice of inputs and
the records are presented to a third party, without telling
them what the preparation, measurement, and transfor-
mation actually is. We also give them the same records
with the order of preparation and measurement variables
reversed (y, b, x, a). If, knowing the theory, they cannot
tell which is the true record and which is the reversed
one, then the theory has operational time symmetry.
One might think that inputs and outputs also ought to
be swapped in the reversed record. However, recall that
our notion of input and output does not directly relate
to time ordering, but is rather to do with controlled vs.
uncontrolled variables. For a preparation, all variables
are in principle controllable, so the specification of which
variables are inputs and which are outputs is fairly ar-
bitrary at this stage. However, we shall be particularly
interested in experiments in which the experimenter has
the same degree of control over a measurement as they do
over a preparation, in which case the distinction between
controlled and uncontrolled variables will be the same in
both the true record and the time reversed one.
Note that, we are not assuming that every experiment
ought to have an operational time reverse. At this point,
it is just a definition. In fact, it would be unnatural
to impose this for the simple reason that it is possible to
send a signal forwards in time, but not backwards in time.
Formally, we expect an operational theory to satisfy∑
b
pPMT (a, b|x, y) =
∑
b
pPMT (a, b|x, y′), (3)
for all y and y′, so that the output of the preparation
cannot be used to infer any information about the input
of the measurement, but there is no reason why the out-
put of the measurement should not contain information
about the input of the preparation, so we do not expect∑
a
pPMT (a, b|x, y) =
∑
a
pPMT (a, b|x′, y), (4)
to hold in general for x 6= x′. If it does not hold, then
eq. (3) prevents the experiment from having an opera-
tional time reverse.
However, we do not believe that the lack of operational
time symmetry is a fundamental asymmetry of physics,
but is rather a consequence of the thermodynamic arrow
of time. Specifically, an operational description of an ex-
periment is, by definition, a description of the experiment
from the point of view of the experimenter. The experi-
menter has a subjective arrow of time. This means that
she can remember the past but not the future, and also
that her past seems fixed but her future seems open and
unpredictable. It is usually thought that the subjective
arrow of time is a consequence of the thermodynamic ar-
row because both memory and control consume a supply
of external low entropy systems. For example, turning
a knob from an initially unknown position to a definite
setting is an erasure process, which increases entropy by
Landauer’s principle [50].
Because of this, an experimenter typically has more
control over the preparation than the measurement, but
there is reason to believe that this is an emergent, rather
than fundamental, asymmetry. Hypothetically, if it were
possible for the experimenter to have a subjective arrow
of time pointing in the opposite direction to the arrow
of time used to describe the rest of the experiment, then
presumably they would be able to control the measure-
ment outcome to the same degree that we can control the
preparation.
In order to identify the fundamental operational time
symmetries, we want to factor out this emergent asym-
metry in some way. One way of doing this would be to
simulate full control over the measurement outcome by
allowing post-selection. Although we could do things this
way, post-selection significantly complicates the analysis.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to instead restrict the ex-
perimenter’s control over the preparation procedure, so
that she cannot send signals forwards in time. Doing this
plays the same role as the “demon of the left” in Price’s
argument.
Definition IV.2. A preparation P is no-signalling if,
for all M ∈ M and T ∈ T such that (P,M, T ) is an
experiment,∑
a
pPMT (a, b|x, y) =
∑
a
pPMT (a, b|x′, y), (5)
for all x and x′.
PNS denotes the set of all no-signalling preparations
in an operational theory. The no-signalling sector of an
operational theory is the operational theory in which P
is restricted to PNS
Note that the no-signalling sector of an operational
theory need not be operationally time symmetric. How-
ever, it is in both quantum theory and classical probabil-
ity theory. This is therefore a nontrivial time symmetry
that our present physical laws obey, which is different
from the conventional notion of time-symmetric dynam-
ical laws.
Theorem IV.3. The no-signalling sector of quantum
theory is operationally time-symmetric.
Proof. First, note that a quantum preparation is no-
signalling iff the ensemble average state is the same for
all inputs, otherwise there would be a measurement that
predicts different probabilities for different preparation
inputs. Therefore, we can define ρA = ρA|x, which is
independent of x.
Given an experiment (P,M, T ), where P is no-
signalling, we have to define an operational time reverse
(P ′,M ′, T ′) that predicts the same probabilities. To do
this, we make use of quantum versions of Bayes’ rule, as
described in [48].
6Specifically, let ρaA|x be the states associated with P ,
let Eb|yB be the POVM elements associated with M , and
let EB|A be the CPT map associated with T . We first
define the POVM elements Ea|xA associated with M ′ via
Ea|xA = ρ
− 12
A ρaA|xρ
− 12
A . (6)
This should be understood as an equation on the sub-
space supp(ρA) of HA, so that ρA has a well defined
inverse. It is easy to check that these operators are pos-
itive and
∑
aEa|xA = Isupp(ρA). If we want HA to be
the Hilbert space associated with M ′ then the operators
Ea|xA may be extended by adding an arbitrary POVM
on the orthogonal subspace to them. Alternatively, we
can just let supp(ρA) be the Hilbert space of M
′.
Next, it is convenient to define the ensemble aver-
age state at the output of the transformation as ρB =
EB|A(ρA). Then we can define the states associated with
P ′ as
ρbB|y = ρ
1
2
BEb|yBρ
1
2
B . (7)
It is easy to check that these operators are positive and∑
b ρbB|y = ρB , so the ensemble average is a normalized
density operator.
Finally, we define the CPT map associated with T ′ as
EA|B( · ) = ρ
1
2
AE†B|A
(
ρ
− 12
B ( · ) ρ
− 12
B
)
ρ
1
2
A, (8)
where E†B|A is the adjoint of EB|A, i.e. the unique map
that satisfies Tr
(
MAE†B|A(NB)
)
= Tr
(
NBEB|A(MA)
)
for all operators MA on HA and all operators NB on
HB . The map EA|B should be understood as a map from
density operators on supp(ρB) to density operators on
HA, and we can extend it to HB arbitrarily if necessary.
The Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism [51, 52] can be used
to verify that this is a well-defined CPT map, as was done
in [48].
With these definitions, it is straightforward to verify
that
pP ′M ′T ′(b, a|y, x) = Tr
(
Ea|xAEA|B(ρbB|y)
)
= Tr
(
Eb|yBEB|A(ρaA|x)
)
= pPMT (a, b|x, y), (9)
as required.
V. ONTOLOGICAL FORMALISM
So far, we have only been discussing the operational
predictions of a theory. We now wish to consider the
possibility that the system has some real physical prop-
erties between preparation and measurement, that are
responsible for mediating any correlations between the
two.
There is a standard framework for discussing this,
known as the ontological models framework [53]. We
think that this is a well motivated framework, but be-
cause the ontological models framework implicitly as-
sumes that there is no retrocausality, and the necessity
of retrocausality is precisely the point at issue, we will
break things down into four more primitive assumptions,
so that the role of the no retrocausality assumption can
be seen more clearly. This will also facilitate a compari-
son with Price’s assumptions in §IX.
We will use influence diagrams (a generalization of
Bayesian networks that allows for decision nodes) [54]
to illustrate our assumptions, but familiarity with such
diagrams is not assumed.
Assumption V.1. (Single-world) Realism: The sys-
tem has some physical properties, a specification of which
is called its ontic state, denoted λ. Ontic states take val-
ues in a (measurable) set Λ called the ontic state space
[55].
On each run of an experiment, the operational vari-
ables (inputs x and y, and outputs a and b) and the
ontic state λ each take a definite value. Our uncertainty
about these variables can be described according to clas-
sical probability theory.
The idea here is that λ represents properties of the
system that exist, but may not be directly observable.
For example, in a classical experiment in statistical me-
chanics, we may only have operational access to variables
describing the macrostate; such as pressure, volume, and
temperature; and the ontic state would be the microstate,
i.e. a specification of the positions and momenta of each
particle. The idea is that perhaps the ways in which we
can manipulate a quantum system are limited in a similar
way.
The exact ontic state may be unknown to the experi-
menter, but it is in principle knowable, even if we cannot
actually construct an experiment that would reveal it.
It is for this reason that we consider the use of classi-
cal probability to be part and parcel of the definition of
realism. Because λ takes a specific value in each run of
experiment, you can in principle resolve a bet on its value
and it has a definite relative frequency in a sequence of
runs, so however you prefer to interpret probability the-
ory, the standard arguments for its use apply. Although
it is sometimes posited that quantum theory should be
understood in terms of a non-standard probability the-
ory, we have yet to see an interpretation of such a theory
that is realist in character.
Our realism is single world because we assume that the
full specification of the ontology includes definite values
for the operational variables, e.g. measurement outcomes.
This rules out Everett/many-worlds. However, adopting
Everett/many-worlds is not actually a way out of our
no-go theorem, because, as explained in the introduc-
tion, it does not have the kind of time symmetry we are
interested in. Therefore, it is possible that the argument
presented here is generalizable to interpretations that in-
volve multiple worlds, but we do not know how to do this
yet.
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be described by a conditional probability distribution
pPMT (a, b, λ|x, y). We assume that the experimenter is
free to choose x and y however they like.
What we mean by free choice of x and y is that the
experimenter can set the probabilities p(x, y) for the in-
puts in any way that she likes, so that the joint proba-
bilities are pPMT (a, b, λ, x, y) = pPMT (a, b, λ|x, y)p(x, y).
All possible combinations of inputs can be tested in as
many runs as she likes [56]. In the language of influ-
ence diagrams, x and y are decision nodes, represented
by squares in fig. 2. In particular, x and y have no direct
causes, i.e. no parents in the graph.
Definition V.3. Given an experiment (P,M, T ), a spec-
ification of an ontic state space Λ together with a condi-
tional probability distribution pPMT (a, b, λ|x, y) is called
an ontic extension of the experiment. The ontic exten-
sion is required to reproduce the predictions of the oper-
ational theory upon marginalizing over λ, i.e.∫
Λ
pPMT (a, b, λ|x, y)dλ = pPMT (a, b|x, y). (10)
We denote an ontic extension by (P,M, T,Λ), leaving
the probabilities implicit.
A choice of ontic extension for each experiment in an
operational theory is called an ontic extension of the the-
ory.
Realism and Free Choice are assumed in the vast
majority of work on realist approaches to quantum the-
ory. We shall therefore tend to just assume that ex-
periments have ontic extensions, rather than mentioning
these two assumptions explicitly.
For the remainder of this section, we will concentrate
on a single experiment (P,M, T ), so we will drop the
subscripts on the probability distributions.
Assumption V.4. No Retrocausality: All non-input
variables should be conditionally independent of input
variables in their future, given a specification of all the
variables in their past.
The possible causal dependencies that are compatible
with no-retrocausality are illustrated in fig. 2. Our as-
sumption can be understood as saying that p(a, b, λ|x, y)
should obey the causal Markov condition with respect to
this diagram.
In more detail, a general conditional probability distri-
bution p(a, b, λ|x, y) can be decomposed as
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|a, λ, x, y)p(λ|a, x, y)p(a|x, y). (11)
The No Retrocausality assumption implies that
we should have p(a|x, y) = p(a|x) and p(λ|a, x, y) =
p(λ|a, x). The first of these two conditions says that there
is no signalling from future to past, which we expect the
operational theory to obey in any case. The second is
λ
x y
a b
FIG. 2. An influence diagram representing the possible causal
influences in a model with no retrocausality. A square rep-
resents a variable that is under the direct control of the ex-
perimenter and a circle represents a variable that they do not
control. An arrow between two nodes u and v in the diagram
represents the possibility that u can be a direct cause of v.
the more substantive assumption, often called measure-
ment independence, and we expect this to be violated
in a theory with retrocausality. The no-retrocausality
assumption implies that the probabilities can be decom-
posed as
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|a, λ, x, y)p(λ|a, x)p(a|x). (12)
Assumption V.5. λ-mediation: The ontic state λ me-
diates any remaining correlation between the preparation
and the measurement, i.e. p(b|a, λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y) [57].
In the language of influence diagrams, the arrows from
a and x to b are eliminated, and we are left with the
causal structure illustrated in fig. 3.
λ
x y
a b
FIG. 3. An influence diagram for an ontological model, which
is an ontic extension that satisfies No Retrocausality and
λ-mediation.
The λ-mediation assumption is really just part of the
definition of what we mean by an ontic state. The prop-
erties of the system are supposed to be the cause of the
correlation between preparation and measurement. If
there are other causal links between them, e.g. a tele-
phone wire, then we are not really doing an experiment
on the system alone, but on the system in combination
with something else. If there are no such links, but we
still allow correlation that is left unexplained by the ontic
state, then we do not really have a realist model.
8Together with No Retrocausality, this assumption
implies that the probabilities can be decomposed as
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|λ, y)p(λ|a, x)p(a|x). (13)
Definition V.6. An ontic extension of an experiment
that satisfies No Retrocausality and λ-mediation, i.e.
its probabilities decompose according to eq. (13), is called
an ontological model of the experiment.
For comparison with other work, note that p(λ|a, x)
is usually called the epistemic state of the system and
p(b|λ, y) is called the response function of the measuring
device. Normally, when proving theorems about real-
ist accounts of quantum theory, the ontological models
framework is simply assumed at the outset. Here, we see
that it is based on several nontrivial assumptions.
Note that, since Price’s version of the argument does
not assume λ-mediation, it is of interest to discuss what
we can prove without it. We do so in appendix A
Note that we needed to state the No Retrocausal-
ity assumption before we could even formulate λ-
mediation. In a theory with retrocausality, we would
want to retain some notion that correlations between
preparation and measurement are caused by the ontic
properties of the system, but we have no license to in-
fer conditional independencies from this if causal loops
are possible. Therefore, λ-mediation would have to be
replaced by something else. What this might be will be
discussed in future work.
VI. ONTOLOGICAL TIME SYMMETRY
Our notion of ontological time symmetry can be for-
mulated without assuming No Retrocausality or λ-
mediation. This is fortunate, as it is something we
might wish to preserve in a retrocausal theory. Nonethe-
less, it is worth pausing to think about the role of λ in
an ontological model in order to understand how to for-
mulate ontological time reversal.
For a classical system, λ is often taken to be the phase
space point occupied by the system, but this does not
completely pin it down. We could take λ to be the phase
space point immediately after the preparation, immedi-
ately before the measurement, or even let λ(t) be the
entire trajectory through phase space between prepara-
tion and measurement. Given knowledge of the trans-
formation T , which in this case is a specification of the
Hamiltonian of the system, each of these choices is suf-
ficient to screen off the preparation from the measure-
ment. There are many other choices besides these, such
as specifying any part of the phase space trajectory, or
dispensing with phase space entirely and specifying the
configuration space point at two different times. Each of
these choices would be equivalent and sufficient for prov-
ing our main result, as the screening off property is the
main requirement.
Thus, in a general ontological model, we expect there
to be multiple equivalent ways of specifying the ontic
state. However, they each have different implications
for how to construct the time-reverse of an ontological
model. For example, if λ is a specification of the prop-
erties of the system just after the preparation, then it
should be thought of as a specification just before the
measurement when we take the time reverse, and the di-
rection of the momentum should be reversed. If it is the
entire trajectory then we also need to reverse the time
direction of λ(t) when we take the time-reverse. In addi-
tion, it is conventional to allow other one-to-one transfor-
mations when we take a time reverse. For example, the
usual notion of time reversal in quantum theory involves
mapping a quantum state |ψ〉 to its complex conjugate
|ψ∗〉, so a similar transformation of the ontic state should
happen in an ontic model in which the quantum state
part of the ontology. For these reasons, we should not
expect that the ontic state λ or even its state space Λ
are invariant under time reversal. Instead, there should
be a one-to-one mapping between the λ’s in the two dif-
ferent experiments.
Although an ontic extension need not be an ontological
model, we still want to conceive of the ontic states as the
same sorts of things in general. Thus, we should allow a
one-to-one correspondence between λ’s when we take the
time reverse of an ontic extension.
Definition VI.1. In an ontic extension of an operational
theory, the ontic extension (P,M, T,Λ) of an experiment
(P,M, T ) has an ontological time reverse if there ex-
ists another experiment (P ′,M ′, T ′), with ontic extension
(P ′,M ′, T ′,Λ′), where P ′ has the same sets of inputs and
outputs as M , M ′ has the same sets of inputs and out-
puts as P , there exists a one-to-one map f : Λ → Λ′,
and
pP ′M ′T ′(b, a, f(λ)|y, x) = pPMT (a, b, λ|x, y). (14)
An ontic extension of an operational theory is ontolog-
ically time symmetric if every experiment has an onto-
logical time reverse.
Clearly, an ontic extension of an operational theory can
only be ontologically time symmetric if the operational
theory is itself operationally time symmetric, since we
can obtain the operational predictions just by marginal-
izing over λ.
Remark VI.2. It is also true, mathematically at least,
that if the ontic extension of an experiment has an onto-
logical time reverse, then there also exists an extension in
which f is the identity. We can construct such an exten-
sion from an arbitrary one by identifying the ontic state
spaces of the time reverse pairs of experiments and set-
ting pP ′M ′T ′(b, a, λ|x, y) in the new extension to the value
of pP ′M ′T ′(b, a, f(λ)|y, x) in the old extension. Physi-
cally, these two extensions may tell very different stories
about what happens between preparation and measure-
ment, but mathematically we can always assume that f
9is trivial without loss of generality, and will do so in what
follows.
VII. THE TIME SYMMETRY ASSUMPTION
We are now in a position to state our main assumption.
Assumption VII.1. Time Symmetry: An ontic ex-
tension of an operational theory satisfies Time Sym-
metry if, whenever an experiment (P,M, T ) has an op-
erational time reverse, the extension (P,M, T,Λ) has an
ontological time reverse.
In particular, an ontic extension of an operationally
time symmetric theory must be ontologically time sym-
metric.
The idea of this is that the most natural explanation
for an operational time-symmetry in a theory is that it
a reflection of an ontological time-symmetry. Note that
an experiment might have an operational time reverse
for trivial reasons if it only records highly coarse-grained
information about the true ontic state of affairs. For ex-
ample, suppose that the inputs of our preparation and
measurement consist of choosing the position of a table
in a room and the outputs consist of counting the number
of plates on the table. Suppose that all of the transfor-
mations we can do involve moving the table around vio-
lently so that some of the plates fall to the ground and
are smashed. This is a fundamentally time asymmetric
theory (at the level of probabilities), but the asymme-
try might not show up at the operational level if some
of the transformations also involve bringing new plates
from the kitchen and placing them on the table. We
would not expect the operational time symmetry of this
theory to be reflected in the ontological description, as
we know that there are plates being smashed but none
being unsmashed.
The reason why this example is problematic is that the
preparations and measurements that we can do are only
giving us access to highly restricted information about
the ontic state. In particular, we are not being allowed
to look at the floor to see if there are any smashed plates
there. The operational time symmetry is an accidental
consequence of our restricted access, rather than a reflec-
tion of a fundamental symmetry.
However, if the no-signalling sector of an entire physi-
cal theory is operationally time symmetric then the time
symmetry assumption seems much more well founded.
Recall that restricting to the no-signalling sector is
merely designed to factor out the subjective arrow of
time of the experimenter, which we do not believe to be
a fundamental asymmetry, but is rather a consequence
of the thermodynamic arrow. If, after doing this, there
is absolutely nothing you can do to determine the time
direction, then this seems like grounds for positing a fun-
damental time symmetry. It is only in this situation that
we want to posit the time symmetry assumption. The-
orem IV.3 shows that this is precisely the situation for
quantum theory.
VIII. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we will be discussing a single experi-
ment and its time reverse, which, due to Definitions IV.1
and VI.1, and Remark VI.2, can be taken to have the
same ontic state space Λ and the same probability dis-
tribution. For this reason, we can drop the subscripts P ,
M , T on the probability distribution.
A. Main theorem
Our main theorem shows that an ontological model
(i.e. an ontic extension satisfying No Retrocausality
and λ-mediation) of an experiment that satisfies Time
Symmetry must obey a temporal analogue of Bell’s lo-
cal causality condition.
Theorem VIII.1. Let (P,M, T ) be an experiment that
has an operational time reverse. If its ontic extension
satisfies No Retrocausality, λ-mediation, and Time
Symmetry then
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(a|x, λ)p(b|y, λ)p(λ). (15)
To understand the role of λ-mediation, it is helpful
to first see what we can prove without it.
Lemma VIII.2. Let (P,M, T ) be an experiment that has
an operational time reverse. If its ontic extension satis-
fies No Retrocausality and Time Symmetry then
p(λ|x, y) = p(λ), (16)
p(b|λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y), (17)
p(a|λ, x, y) = p(a|λ, x). (18)
Proof. By No Retrocausality, the probabilities decom-
pose as
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|λ, x, a, y)p(λ|a, x)p(a|x). (19)
Using Bayes’ rule, we have
p(λ|a, x) = p(a|λ, x)p(λ|x)
p(a|x) . (20)
Substituting this back into eq. (19) gives
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|λ, x, a, y)p(a|λ, x)p(λ|x). (21)
Summing over a and b then gives p(λ|x, y) = p(λ|x). By
Time Symmetry, we also have the decomposition
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(a|λ, x, y, b)p(λ|b, y)p(b|y), (22)
and applying the same argument to this gives p(λ|x, y) =
p(λ|y). We therefore have p(λ|x, y) = p(λ|x) = p(λ|y),
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but this means that it cannot depend on either x or y,
so p(λ|x, y) = p(λ).
Substituting this into eq. (21) and summing over b
gives
p(a, λ|x, y) = p(a|λ, x)p(λ). (23)
Dividing both sides by p(λ|x, y), which is equal to p(λ),
gives
p(a|λ, x, y) = p(a|λ, x). (24)
as required. Applying the same argument to the time-
reversed decomposition will then give
p(b|λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y) (25)
Proof of theorem VIII.1. In the context of a spacelike
Bell experiment, eq. (16) is known as measurement in-
dependence, and equations (17) and (18) are known as
parameter independence. These conditions, together with
p(b|a, λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, x, y), (26)
which is known as outcome independence, are known
to imply Bell’s local causality condition [58–60]. How-
ever, in the timelike context, eq. (26) is an instance
of λ-mediation. In fact, we have the stronger condi-
tion that p(b|a, λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y), so this combined with
lemma VIII.2 implies eq. (15).
For completeness, we repeat the proof that these con-
ditions imply local causality here.
An ontic extension that satisfies No Retrocausality
has decomposition
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|a, λ, x, y)p(λ|a, x, y)p(a|x). (27)
By the Bayes’ rule argument used in the proof of
lemma VIII.2, we can rewrite this as
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|a, λ, x, y)p(a|λ, x, y)p(λ|x). (28)
By measurement independence, we have p(λ|x) = p(λ).
By parameter independence we have p(a|λ, x, y) =
p(a|λ, x). By outcome independence we have
p(b|a, λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, x, y) and then by parameter in-
dependence we have p(b|λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y). Substituting
all this into eq. (28) gives
p(a, b, λ|x, y) = p(b|λ, y)p(a|λ, x)p(λ), (29)
as required.
B. Example of a quantum violation
Equation (15) is incompatible with some experiments
in the no-signalling sector of quantum theory, for the
same sort of reason as it is incompatible with Bell in-
equality violating experiments in the spacelike case. In
particular, in the case where all the inputs and outputs
are two-valued binary variables, it is well known that (15)
implies the CHSH inequality [61, 62].
1
4
∑
x,y
p(a⊕ b = xy|x, y) ≤ 3
4
, (30)
where ⊕ is addition modulo 2.
In the timelike context, the CHSH inequality can be
violated using a single qubit, by taking HA = HB = C2,
defining the projectors
[θ] = (cos
θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉)(cos θ
2
〈0|+ sin θ
2
〈1|), (31)
and using
ρ0A|0 =
1
2
[0], ρ1A|0 =
1
2
[pi], (32)
ρ0A|1 =
1
2
[pi
2
]
ρ1A|1 =
1
2
[
−pi
2
]
, (33)
E0|0B =
[pi
4
]
E1|0B =
[
−3pi
4
]
, (34)
E0|1B =
[
−pi
4
]
E1|1B =
[
3pi
4
]
, (35)
and taking EB|A to be the identity superoperator.
The preparation is no-signalling because the ensem-
ble average state for both inputs is the maximally mixed
state ρA|0 = ρA|1 = IA/2. This experiment gives a value
for the LHS of eq. (30) of (
√
2+2)/4 ≈ 0.854, in violation
of the inequality.
C. General quantum violation
In general, we would like to determine exactly which
experiments in the no-signalling sector of quantum the-
ory can have an ontic extension satisfying No Retro-
causality, λ-mediation, and Time Symmetry, and
which cannot. Specifically, given an initial ensemble aver-
age state ρA, and a CPT map EB|A, when can all experi-
ments consisting of preparing an ensemble decomposition
of ρA, applying the transformation EB|A, and measuring
a POVM on HB , have an ontic extension satisfying these
assumptions? It turns out that this question is equiva-
lent to asking when a bipartite state ρAB on the tensor
product HA⊗HB admits a local hidden variable theory,
which is a question that has been studied extensively in
the literature [63].
To see this, we again make use of the formalism de-
scribed in [48]. Given a channel EB|A, we can define a
bipartite operator ρB|A on HA ⊗HB , known as a condi-
tional state, via the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism as
follows
ρB|A = IA ⊗ EB|A′
(∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣
AA′
)
, (36)
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where A′ is a system with the same Hilbert space as A,
|Φ+〉AA′ =
∑
j |jj〉AA′ , and IA is the identity superoper-
ator on HA. This is an isomorphism because the action
of the CPT map can be recovered via
EB|A(MA) = TrA
(
ρTAB|AMA ⊗ IB
)
, (37)
for any operator MA on HA, and where TA is partial
transpose in the |j〉 basis.
One can then define a bipartite state on HA ⊗HB via
ρAB =
(
ρ
1
2
A ⊗ IB
)
ρB|A
(
ρ
1
2
A ⊗ IB
)
. (38)
This state has ρA = TrB (ρAB) as its reduced state, and
the action of EB|A on supp(ρA) can be recovered by in-
verting eq. (38) and then applying eq. (37). We can thus
consider this an isomorphism between pairs (ρA, EB|A)
and bipartite states ρAB . Although the action of EB|A
outside supp(ρA) is not recovered by the inverse transfor-
mation, it is irrelevant for determining the probabilities
for experiments with ensemble average state ρA, so we
will get a true isomorphism of the experimental proba-
bilities.
Specifically, for any set of ensemble decompositions of
ρA into states ρaA|x and any set of POVMs Eb|yB on HB ,
it is straightforward to check that
Tr
(
Eb|yBEB|A(ρaA|x)
)
= Tr
(
Ea|xA ⊗ Eb|yBρAB
)
, (39)
where Ea|xA is defined in terms of ρA and ρaA|x via
eq. (6). We can conversely take any POVM on Ea|Ax and
invert eq. (6) to obtain ensemble decompositions. The
right hand side of this equation represents the predic-
tions for local measurements made on the bipartite state
ρAB . Applied to this experiment, eq. (15) is just Bell’s
local causality in its original context of spacelike EPR-
type experiments. Thus, a state-CP map pair (ρA, EB|A)
admits an ontic extension satisfying No Retrocausal-
ity, λ-mediation, and Time Symmetry exactly when
the predictions for local measurements on ρAB admit a
local hidden variable theory.
IX. PRICE’S ARGUMENT
As given in [1], Price’s argument is based on three as-
sumptions, which he calls Realism, Time-symmetry, and
Discreteness. There are also unstated background as-
sumptions, which are equivalent to our Realism and
Free Choice assumptions. Since these are common to
both arguments, we will leave them implicit in what fol-
lows.
Price summarises his argument as
Realism + Time-symmetry + Discreteness
=⇒ Retrocausality.
To give this a similar logical form to our result, this could
be rewritten as
No Retrocausality + Realism + Time-
symmetry + Discreteness =⇒ Contradic-
tion (with quantum theory)
As noted in the introduction, Price’s Realism assump-
tion is an assumption of the reality of the quantum state.
In our terminology, an ontic extension of a quantum ex-
periment is called ψ-ontic if, in the case where the states
ρaA|x are pure, i.e. ρaA|x = p(a|x) |ψa|x〉 〈ψa|x|A, the
distributions p(λ|a, x) and p(λ|a′x′) have disjoint sup-
ports whenever |ψa|x〉 〈ψa|x| and |ψa′|x′〉 〈ψa′|x′ | are dis-
tinct [64]. An extension that is not ψ-ontic is called
ψ-epistemic. We call the assumption that an extension
should be ψ-ontic, the ψ-ontology assumption.
As discussed in the introduction, Price’s Discreteness
assumption is needed to argue that a photon exiting a
beamsplitter and then being detected on one of the out-
put ports is the time reverse of a photon being inserted
into a beamsplitter along a definite input port. This
guarantees that the operational time reversal used in
Price’s argument can be identified as a true time reverse.
His Time-symmetry assumption is then that this time
reverse should be an ontological time reverse as well. In
fact, Price’s experiment is its own operational time re-
verse, i.e. P ′ = P , M ′ = M and T ′ = T , so he only
needs to apply the assumption in this case. Note that, if
we time reverse the density operators and POVMs from
the experiment we described in §VIII B using eq. (6) and
eq. (7), we do not obtain the same experiment. However,
this experiment has more than one operational time re-
verse because we can apply a unitary U to the states and
its inverse U† to the POVM elements without changing
the operational predictions. By doing this, we can rotate
the states and measurements back to the original ones,
and we see that the original experiment is indeed its own
operational time reverse. Thus, we could restrict the
Time Symmetry assumption to experiments that are
their own time reverse in our argument as well, although
we see no good reason for doing so. In any case, our
Time Symmetry assumption plays an equivalent role
to the conjunction of Discreteness and Time symmetry
in Price’s argument.
Replacing Price’s Realism, Discreteness, and Time
symmetry assumptions with our ψ-ontology and Time
Symmetry assumptions, the logic of Price’s argument
becomes
No Retrocausality + ψ-ontology + Time
Symmetry =⇒ Contradiction (with quan-
tum theory).
Note that Price’s argument does not require λ-
mediation, but we consider this a more reasonable as-
sumption to make than ψ-ontology, since ψ-epistemic
retrocausal theories are of interest. In fairness to Price,
he does point out that retrocausal ψ-epistemic models are
possible, and gives an example. However, as explained
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shortly, without ψ-ontology, the experiment considered
by Price also has a non-retrocausal ψ-epistemic model, so
his argument is not sufficient to show that such models
should be retrocausal.
We can reconstruct the logic of Price’s argument in
our framework, with an even simpler experiment than he
uses. Consider an experiment that has no measurement,
i.e. formally the input and output variables of the mea-
surement can take only one possible value, so we can drop
y and b from our probability distributions, and represent
the “measurement” by the trivial single-outcome POVM
IB . The preparation has a binary input and output. All
that really matters for the argument is that the ρaA|x’s
are four distinct pure states, but for definiteness we will
use a qubit and the following four quantum states
ρ0A|0 =
1
2
[0] ρ1A|0 =
1
2
[pi] , (40)
ρ0A|1 =
1
2
[pi
2
]
ρ1A|1 =
1
2
[
−pi
2
]
. (41)
By the ψ-ontology assumption, the four probability
distributions p(λ|a, x) each have disjoint support. This
means that the two distributions p(λ|x) also have disjoint
support because
p(λ|x) =
∑
a
p(λ|a, x)p(a|x), (42)
so, for a fixed x we have a convex combination of two dis-
tributions and hence supp(p(λ|x)) = ∪asupp(p(λ|a, x)),
which are disjoint for different values of x. In particu-
lar, this means that λ and x are not independent, i.e.
p(λ|x) 6= p(λ).
Now consider the operational time reverse of this ex-
periment. By No Retrocausality its ontic extension
must satisfy p(λ|x) = p(λ) because x is now the mea-
surement input and λ is in its causal past. However, by
Time Symmetry, these probabilities must be the same
as in the original experiment, so we have a contradiction.
The intuition behind this argument is that if the quan-
tum state is real in the original experiment, in the sense of
disjoint supports for the p(λ|a, x)’s, then the p(λ|a, x)’s
must still have disjoint support in the ontological time
reverse. This implies that the retrodictive states, evolv-
ing backwards from the measurement to the preparation,
must also be real, which contradicts No Retrocausal-
ity.
If, following Price, we only want to apply the Time
Symmetry assumption to experiments that are their
own operational time reverse, then we can add a mea-
surement to the end of the experiment, with POVM ele-
ments
E0|0B = [0] E1|0B = [pi] , (43)
E0|1B =
[pi
2
]
E1|1B =
[
−pi
2
]
. (44)
Using eq. (6) and eq. (7), it is easily checked that this
is its own operational time reverse. This is a tempo-
ral version of the EPR experiment and is the example
Assumptions Experiment
No Retrocausality Prepare one of four
ψ-ontology distinct pure states
Time Symmetry
No Retrocausality
ψ-ontology Timelike Bohm-EPR
Self Time Symmetry
No Retrocausality
λ-mediation Timelike Bell-CHSH
(Self) Time Symmetry
TABLE I. Summary of the assumptions and experiments in-
volved in the two versions of Price’s argument and in our
argument. Self Time Symmetry refers to the Time Sym-
metry assumption restricted to experiments that are their
own operational time reverse.
that Price actually uses. However, the reasoning for this
experiment would be exactly the same as above. One
reason for preferring this version is that, without the No
Retrocausality assumption, Time Symmetry and ψ-
ontology now imply that both the usual forwards evolv-
ing quantum state and the backwards evolving retrodic-
tive state must be real in the same experiment. However,
the contradiction does not depend on having this extra
feature.
To conclude this section, we note that, without the ψ-
ontology assumption, the experiment just described has
a very simple ontological model, i.e. an ontic extension
satisfying No Retrocausality and λ-mediation. This
is just the Spekkens’ toy theory [7], regarded as an on-
tological model for qubits prepared and measured in the
eigenstates of Pauli operators.
Specifically, suppose that the ontic state space Λ con-
sists of two bits, λ0 and λ1. We set the epistemic
states p(λ0, λ1|a, x) = 12δλx,a, where δ is the Kronecker
δ-function, and the response functions p(b|λ0, λ1, y) =
δλy,b. In addition, p(a|x) = 12 for this experiment. This
gives the joint probabilities
p(a, b, λ0, λ1|x, y)
= p(b|λ0, λ1, y)p(λ0, λ1|a, x)p(a|x)
=
1
4
δλy,bδλx,a, (45)
which reproduces the operational predictions upon
marginalizing over λ0 and λ1. In addition, this distribu-
tion is invariant under the exchange of (a, x) with (b, y),
so the operational time reverse, which is the same exper-
iment in this case, is modelled by the same distribution,
so Time Symmetry is satisfied.
This model is ψ-epistemic as, for example, the distri-
butions p(λ0, λ1|a = 0, x = 0) and p(λ0, λ1|a = 0, x = 1)
both assign probability 1/2 to the ontic state λ0 =
0, λ1 = 0. It does, however, satisfy λ-mediation because
it is an ontological model. This shows that ψ-ontology
is essential for Price’s argument, but not well justified for
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the example he uses.
X. TIME SYMMETRY IN DE BROGLIE-BOHM
AND EVERETT
In the introduction, we mentioned that de Broglie-
Bohm (dBB) theory and the Everett/many-worlds inter-
pretation both satisfy the conventional notion of time
symmetry of dynamical laws, but they are not counter-
examples to our argument because Time Symmetry is
a different notion.
The case of dBB is the easiest to deal with because it
satisfies all of our assumptions other than Time Sym-
metry. Consider an experiment performed on a spin- 12
particle, where the preparation and measurement are of
the spin. The preparation prepares pure states |ψx|a〉
and the measurement is in orthonormal bases |φb|y〉 (one
basis for each value of y). Suppose that the position
state |Ψ(~r)〉 remains uncorrelated with the spin between
the preparation and measurement so that |Ψ(~r)〉 is the
same for all choices of x and a. In dBB, the ontic state
of this system consists of two pieces: the quantum state
|Ψ(~r)〉 ⊗ |ψa|x〉 and the position ~R of the particle, i.e.
λ = (|Ψ(~r)〉 ⊗ |ψa|x〉 , ~R). The quantum state evolves
according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and the position
evolves according to the guidance equation, both of which
are symmetric under the replacement of t with −t [65].
Since the position state is the same for all the experi-
ments we are considering, and hence the position ~R is al-
ways distributed in the same way, the violation of Time
Symmetry is entirely due to the spin state.
Since this theory is ψ-ontic, it is susceptible to the ar-
guments given for the example in the previous section.
Namely, given that p(λ|x) depends on x (i.e. the spin
part of the quantum state is either |0〉 or |pi〉 if x = 0,
and either
∣∣pi
2
〉
or
∣∣−pi2 〉 if x = 1), λ, which includes the
spin state, is necessarily different for each choice of x.
Time symmetry then implies that λ should depend on
the measurement choice as well, but it does not as the
quantum state only depends on the choice of prepara-
tion, and the distribution of positions is the same for all
experiments.
As shown by Price’s argument, a ψ-ontic theory needs
to include a backwards evolving retrodictive state, in ad-
dition to the usual predictive state, in its ontology in
order to satisfy Time Symmetry. For example, the
transactional interpretation [3, 4] and the two state vec-
tor formalism [5, 6], interpreted realistically, both posit
such states and satisfy Time Symmetry.
The reason why this does not conflict with the dynam-
ical time symmetry of dBB is that operational time sym-
metry and dynamical time symmetry disagree on what
is the time reverse of an experiment. To see this, it is
useful to look at the dynamical time reverse of a prepare
and measure experiment. In order to exhibit dynamical
time reversal, it is necessary to treat the preparation and
measurement devices quantum mechanically, as dynami-
cal time symmetry only holds when we do not apply the
measurement postulates of quantum theory. In any case,
this is how measurement is supposed to be handled in
dBB, as the measurement postulates are understood as
effective rules that apply when there is sufficient deco-
herence in the position basis.
To do this, we introduce four systems in addition to the
spin- 12 particle S. The preparation device has an input,
described by a physical device such as a switch, which
we label X. X can be in one of several orthogonal states
|x〉X corresponding to the different choices of prepara-
tion input. The output is described by a device such as a
pointer, which we label system A, with orthogonal states
|a〉A corresponding to the output. Importantly, both X
and A are macroscopic systems with the different |x〉X
states having almost no overlap in position and similarly
for the |a〉A states. The measurement device is also de-
scribed by two macroscopic systems, Y and B, describing
its inputs and outputs, with macroscopically distinct or-
thogonal states |y〉Y and |b〉B . Prior to the experiment,
the systems are in the state |x〉X⊗|0〉A⊗|y〉Y ⊗|0〉B⊗|0〉S ,
the important points being that the preparation and mea-
surement inputs are set according to the choice of the ex-
perimenter, and the spin- 12 particle and output systems
are in fixed states.
The preparation can then be described by a unitary
operation UXAS , which only acts on X, A and S as
UXAS |x〉X ⊗ |0〉A ⊗ |0〉S
= |x〉X ⊗
∑
a
1√
p(a|x) |a〉A ⊗ |ψa|x〉 , (46)
Similarly, the measurement can be described by a unitary
operation VY BS , which only acts on Y , B and S as
VY BS |y〉Y ⊗ |0〉B ⊗ |ψ〉S
= |y〉Y ⊗
∑
b
|b〉B ⊗
[
φb|y
] |ψ〉 . (47)
UXAS maps states in which A and S are uncorrelated
to an entangled superposition of different S states cor-
related with the value of A, and similarly VY BS maps
states in which B and S are uncorrelated to an entan-
gled superposition of different S states correlated with
the value of B. Their dynamical time reverses U†XAS and
V †Y BS do the opposite, mapping these correlated states to
unentangled ones. Thus, although preparations and mea-
surements are operational time reverses of one another,
they are not dynamical time reverses of one another, but
rather both operations have the same sort of form. The
dynamical time reverse of a measurement would be a
kind of preparation in which we are allowed to initially
place the system in a superposition of different prepara-
tion outputs, rather than one in which a takes a definite
value.
The case of Everett/many-worlds is a little more sub-
tle, as, unlike dBB, it does not satisfy the ”single world”
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part of our (Single World) Realism assumption, so it
does not fit into the framework we have used to prove
our result. Therefore, to make the argument that many-
worlds does not satisfy Time Symmetry in rigorous
detail, one would first have to reformulate Time Sym-
metry in a framework that allows experiments to have
multiple co-existent outcomes at the ontological level.
Nonetheless, even without doing this, the intuitive idea
of Time Symmetry is still clear: experiments that
are operational time reverses of one another ought to
be time reverses at the ontological level. Because many-
worlds posits the unitary evolution of the usual forwards-
evolving quantum state as its entire ontology, it is ψ-ontic
and does not satisfy Time Symmetry due to the lack
of an ontic backwards evolving state. However, this does
not contradict dynamical time symmetry, which works
the same way as in dBB.
For most no-go theorems, such as Bell’s theorem and
results about contextuality, the move to a many-worlds
framework completely evades the conclusions of the the-
orem. It is therefore intriguing that this move does not
help to evade our result.
Readers who are happy with dynamical time symmetry
may be inclined to reject our Time Symmetry assump-
tion at this point. However, the conceptual idea of time
symmetry—that you cannot tell the difference between
a video played forwards and played in reverse—is more
fundamental than any particular mathematical formali-
sation of it. In a theory in which the operational predic-
tions are probabilistic, and in which there is no universal
agreement about ontology, there will be several different
formalisations of time symmetry. Although dynamical
time symmetry is the traditional notion, it does not have
a unique claim to capture the basic concept. Even if one
does view dynamical time symmetry as more fundamen-
tal than operational time symmetry, the latter is still a
symmetry that exists in quantum theory, and it lacks an
explanation in theories that reject our Time Symmetry
assumption.
XI. RELATION TO SPEKKENS
CONTEXTUALITY
Spekkens’ variant of noncontextuality states that ex-
perimental procedures that are operationally equivalent,
in the sense of predicting the same probabilities, should
be represented the same way in an ontological model
[49]. In particular, two preparation procedures that al-
ways yield the same probabilities for every measurement
should correspond to the same epistemic state, or prob-
ability distribution, over the ontic states. This is known
as preparation noncontextuality.
In the present context, when we consider the ensem-
ble average over outputs of a no-signalling preparation,
the operational probabilities obey p(b|x, y) = p(b|x′, y) =
p(b|y) for all x, x′, which is just the no-signalling condi-
tion. Therefore in a preparation noncontextual ontologi-
cal model, we must have p(λ|x) = p(λ|x′) = p(λ). In our
main theorem, we derived this as a consequence of Time
Symmetry instead.
In quantum theory, no-signalling preparations corre-
spond to different ensemble decompositions of the same
density operator ρA, so preparation noncontextuality
says that, in an ontological model, ρA should be rep-
resented by the same probability distribution over λ, re-
gardless of which ensemble decomposition was used to
prepare it.
Spekkens’ showed that no ontological model can satisfy
this instance of preparation noncontextuality for a par-
ticular setup involving decompositions of the maximally
mixed state of a qubit into six pure states [49]. It has
also been shown that this instance preparation noncon-
textuality implies temporal Bell inequalities, such as the
CHSH inequality we used here [26]. These results can
therefore be used as alternative proofs of the impossibil-
ity of an ontological model satisfying Time Symmetry.
These preparation contextuality results have been
demonstrated experimentally [26, 66], so these experi-
ments can also be viewed as demonstrations of our result.
However, we would like an experimental confirmation to
be independent of the details of quantum theory, which
raises some important issues.
Firstly, our time symmetry assumption is only sup-
posed to be applied to experiments in the no-signalling
sector of an operational theory. Without assuming a
background theory, like quantum theory, there is really
no way of verifying that a preparation is no-signalling.
This is because, although every measurement we have so
far managed to perform might reveal no signal from the
preparation, there could always be some novel measure-
ment, which we have not figured out how to do yet, that
would yield a signal. Tests of preparation contextuality
face a similar issue, which is that two preparation proce-
dures cannot be shown to be operationally equivalent by
experiment alone. If we are willing to make additional
assumptions, such as the assumption that the measure-
ments we can do are tomographically complete, then it is
possible to devise robust tests of preparation contextual-
ity that do not suffer from this problem [67], and these
tests could, in the same way, be used as robust tests of
our main result.
However, we also think that the Time Symmetry
assumption should only be applied to theories that have
an operationally time symmetric no-signalling sector, in
order to avoid the kind of accidental time symmetries
discussed in §VII. This is truly impossible to verify ex-
perimentally, as it would involve testing every possible
no-signalling experiment. Therefore, whilst experimen-
tally robust tests of some forms of preparation contextu-
ality can also be viewed as tests of our result, we think
that the main significance of our result is in the context
of a specific theory, which may or may not be quantum,
but is known to be operationally time symmetric on the-
oretical grounds.
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XII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that there is no ontic extension of
quantum theory that satisfies No Retrocausality, λ-
mediation, and our Time Symmetry assumption,
i.e. the requirement that an operational time symmetry
should imply an ontological one. Requiring an ontic ex-
tension can be broken down into two assumptions: Re-
alism and Free Choice. Our main result shows that at
least one of these five assumptions must be given up.
Realism and Free Choice are part and parcel of what
is normally meant by a realist theory, and are shared
by many no-go theorems, such as Bell’s theorem. Their
status here is no different from in these other contexts.
Proponents of Copenhagenish interpretations deny that
ontic states exist at all, so they would give up on Re-
alism. Since our intention is to investigate realist inter-
pretations, we need not discuss this option further here.
However, one can potentially also give up Realism by
denying that it is actually required for a realist interpre-
tation. For example, since our realism is single-world,
the Everett/many-worlds interpretation does not satisfy
it, but, as discussed in the introduction, Everett/many-
worlds is not time symmetric in the sense we are inter-
ested in, so adopting it does not solve the problem. Still,
it is possible that a different interpretation that involves
multiple worlds might exist that does have an appropri-
ate time symmetry. Another option is to adopt a non-
standard logic or probability theory. Whilst this idea
is appealing, the interpretation of such theories is usu-
ally operational, and a compelling realist underpinning
is currently lacking.
In our view, the idea that ontic states are responsible
for correlations between preparation and measurement,
which is the idea behind λ-mediation, is also a core
feature of a realist theory. It encodes the idea that ontic
states are supposed to explain what we see in experi-
ments. If we are contemplating giving up No Retro-
causality, then it is not entirely clear how to formulate
this assumption, as conditional independence of past and
future variables given λ is not a reasonable condition in a
theory where λ can be causally affected by things both in
its past and in its future. Nonetheless, some semblance
of the idea that preparations and measurements are cor-
related because of λ needs to be retained in a retrocausal
theory, and it is a challenge for proponents of retrocausal
views to formalize this in a meaningful way.
This leaves us with Time Symmetry and No Retro-
causality as the most reasonable assumptions to give up.
Both of these assumptions can be viewed as special cases
of the idea that an ontic extension should not be fine
tuned, which makes it difficult to make a clear choice
between them.
Loosely speaking, a no-fine tuning assumption means
that, when the operational predictions have a specified
property, e.g. a symmetry, we postulate that the underly-
ing realist theory should also have the same property. For
example, the operational predictions of quantum theory
do not allow us to send signals into the past, so we posit
that there are no causal influences from future to past
in the underlying theory. This is the No Retrocausal-
ity assumption. Similarly, the operational predictions of
quantum theory obey a certain kind of time symmetry,
so we posit this symmetry for the underlying theory as
well. This is our Time Symmetry assumption.
No fine tuning assumptions are extremely common
in no-go theorems for quantum theory. For example,
Spekkens’ noncontextuality assumption, i.e. procedures
that are operationally identical should be identical in the
underlying theory, is of this type, as is parameter inde-
pendence in Bell’s theorem, i.e. we cannot send signals
superluminally, so our choice of measurement should not
affect anything at the other wing of the experiment su-
perluminally either [68].
No fine tuning assumptions seem reasonable because,
if a given property holds in the underlying theory, then
we can accept that property as a fundamental physical
principle. For example, that there are no causal influ-
ences from future to past might be accepted as such a
principle. Then, the explanation for why the property
holds at the operational level is just by appeal to that
principle. For example, if there are no causal influences
from future to past at all, then obviously there must be
no signalling from future to past.
However, when a property holds operationally, but not
ontologically, then it cannot be because of a fundamental
physical principle. Instead, there is a tension that cries
out for explanation. For example, if there actually are
influences from future to past then why is it that we
cannot use those influences to send a signal?
This can only happen if the probabilities describing
our ignorance of the true ontic state are fine tuned. For
example, if there are retrocausal influences in the theory,
but no signalling into the past, then the correlations be-
tween the operational variables and the ontic states must
be set in such a way that the possibility of signalling will
be exactly washed out upon marginalizing over the ontic
state.
Note that we expect our operational experiments to
only reveal coarse-grained information about the ontic
state, e.g. consider the classical example in which the on-
tic state is the microstate, but the operational degrees
of freedom only probe the macrostate. However, we do
not expect our experiments to be so coarse grained that
they completely miss key features of the underlying on-
tology. For example, in statistical mechanics we can in
fact detect many properties of the ontology by observing
the small statistical fluctuations they cause, as in Brown-
ian motion. Therefore, if there are retrocausal influences,
one would expect to be able to use them in some way to
signal, even if this is not as straightforward as by directly
observing the ontic state. If not, there is an explanatory
gap that needs filling.
Since both No Retrocausality and Time Symme-
try are no-fine tuning assumptions, the case for each of
them is equally compelling. However, there are at least
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three possible ways of dealing with a fine tuning, which
are appropriate in different circumstances, and can help
to shed light on which one of them must go.
1. We can accept them as brute facts.
2. We can look for an alternative framework that is
not fine-tuned.
3. We can explain them as emergent.
The first option is to just accept that the fine tuning is
a prediction of our physical theory, and leave it at that.
If the ontological description is playing any explanatory
role at all then it is going to differ from the operational
description in at least some respects, some of which will
be mere accidents. Therefore, this might be an appropri-
ate response if we are looking at some rather specific and
convoluted property of the operational predictions that
does not seem closely connected to fundamental physical
principles. However, both time symmetry and the lack of
signalling into the past seem like general features of our
physical world, which deserve a better explanation than
this.
The second option is to say that the fine tuning does
not actually exist in nature, but is rather an indication
that one of our other assumptions is wrong. Once we
discard the, perhaps implicit, faulty assumption, we will
be able to find a theory with no fine tunings. In the
present context, it is not completely out of the question
to discard Realism so that we can retain some version of
both No Retrocausality and Time Symmetry, but,
as we have discussed, it is challenging to conceive of a
realist framework that does not assume Realism.
This brings us to the third option, which is emergent
fine tunings. As an example of this, consider a universe
that is in thermal equilibrium everywhere at a fixed tem-
perature. This universe contains many fine tunings, e.g.
it is not possible to send a signal into the future in this
universe, let alone the past. The underlying statistical
mechanical description says that there are possible non-
equilibrium states in the theory that do not have this
property, so the probabilities seem fine tuned in order to
prevent signalling into the future. However, in this case,
we have a dynamical explanation of the fine tuning. If
the universe does start in a nonequilibrium state then the
dynamics will, with high probability, eventually evolve
the universe towards equilibrium. This is, of course, a
perfectly legitimate explanation of why we might see an
apparent fine tuning.
If we accept this kind of explanation, then we also have
to accept that the fine tuning is not based on a fundamen-
tal physical principle, and is likely to have been violated
somewhere in the universe at some point, e.g. in the early
universe shortly after the big bang, before the analogue
of the equilibration process had time to take hold. It is
difficult to see how this could happen for Time Symme-
try, which seems like a fundamental physical symmetry,
but much easier for No Retrocausality.
Recall that the very definition of the subjective arrow
of time is that we can remember the past, which seems
fixed, but the future seems open and manipulable. If sig-
nalling into both the past and the future were common-
place then there would be no definite subjective arrow of
time, and arguably no possibility for subjective experi-
ence. There are good reasons for believing that this arrow
is necessarily aligned with the thermodynamic arrow of
time, and we already believe that the thermodynamic ar-
row is emergent, to be explained by the initial conditions
of the universe, rather than a fundamental principle of
physics. It is therefore plausible that the possibility of
signalling into the past in a universe with retrocausality
would be washed out by the same processes from which
the thermodynamic arrow emerges.
In other words, given that we already need an asym-
metry in the boundary conditions of the universe in or-
der to account for the thermodynamic arrow of time, it
seems plausible that this same asymmetry could be used
to explain why there is signalling into the future, but no
signalling into the past, in a universe with retrocausality.
We conclude that the most plausible response to our re-
sult, other than giving up Realism, is to posit that there
might be retrocausality in nature. At the very least, this
is a concrete and little explored possibility that holds the
promise of evading almost all no-go theorems in the foun-
dations of quantum theory, so it should be investigated
further.
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Appendix A: Dropping λ-mediation
If we drop λ-mediation, then lemma VIII.2 still ap-
plies, so the probabilities in an ontic extension of an ex-
periment must satisfy
p(λ|x, y) = p(λ), (A1)
p(b|λ, x, y) = p(b|λ, y), (A2)
p(a|λ, x, y) = p(a|λ, x). (A3)
In the context of a spacelike Bell experiment, eq. (A1)
is called measurement independence, which is an impli-
cation of No Retrocausality applied to that context.
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Equation (A2) and eq. (A3) are known as parameter in-
dependence in the that context. Thus, everything we can
prove from measurement independence and parameter in-
dependence for a spacelike Bell experiment, we can also
prove from No Retrocausality and Time Symmetry
for a timelike experiment.
In particular, this means that we can apply the
Colbeck-Renner theorem [35, 36] (see [8] for a treatment
in the ontological models framework). From the assump-
tions of measurement independence and parameter in-
dependence, they prove that there is a particular Bell
experiment for which the probabilities must obey
p(a|x, λ) = p(a|x), p(b|y, λ) = p(b|y). (A4)
This means that, although we cannot prove that an ontic
extension is impossible for this experiment, knowing the
ontic state does not enable you to make finer-grained
predictions about the marginal probabilities for either
side of the experiment than just knowing its input would.
However, they may still allow finer-grained predictions
about how the two wings are correlated. Thus, although
we may still posit ontic states, they are not adding as
much as we might have hoped to the theory.
The experiment used by Colbeck and Renner can be
converted into a timelike experiment using the construc-
tion given in §VIII C. From this, we get the same conclu-
sion in the timelike case as in the spacelike case: know-
ing λ does not help to predict the preparation output if
you know its input, and similarly for the measurement.
Thus, an ontic extension does not really add as much
as we might have hoped to the predictive power of the
theory.
The timelike experiment used to prove this result uses
a qubit with the identity transformation between prepa-
ration and measurement. It has inputs x and y that run
from 0 to N − 1, and binary outputs. The preparation is
described by the states
ρaA|x =
1
2
[( x
N
+ a
)
pi
]
, (A5)
and the measurement by the operators
Eb|yB =
[(
2y + 1
2N
+ b
)
pi
]
. (A6)
The Colbeck-Renner proof works in the limit that N →
∞. In this limit, the experiment involves preparing every
pure state in the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere as we
vary over x and a, and we could easily modify the proof
to work on any plane of the Bloch sphere. Similarly, we
could embed the proof in any two dimensional subspace
of a higher dimensional Hilbert space. Thus, p(a|x, λ) =
p(a|x) and p(b|y, λ) = p(b|y) for an experiment that can
prepare any pure state in quantum theory.
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